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372 FRANCE; Modem Period
industrial laboratories were founded between 1945 and 
1955. At the same time, the state made available financial 
support for university research and put into place special­
ized research centers such as the Centre de I’finergie 
Atomique (Center of Atomic Energy), or CEA. The Centre 
National de la Recherche Scientifique (National Center for 
Scientific Research), or CNRS, created in 1939, was pri­
marily oriented toward basic research. A highly volun­
tarist policy was put in place by President Charles de 
Gaulle starting in 1959, which particularly benefited big 
state laboratories and large businesses. During the 1970s, 
an attempt was made to reorient policy toward the needs 
of the market and to benefit medium-sized businesses. The 
development of research networks was also a goal, to en­
courage dialogue between public and private research in 
an increasingly European context.
Consumers were open to the change. Starting in the 
1830s, the increase in income and the development of 
transport permitted the diffusion of new ways of living. 
Food products by households became more diverse. Semi- 
durable products such as cottons, shoes, and household 
goods, but also newspapers and books, were spread 
through the whole of society. Thanks to the railway, the 
taste for travel and leisure conquered all classes of society. 
The middle-class French person favored expenses devoted 
to housing and to the education of children, while the 
worker sacrificed housing expenses in favor of food costs. 
The use of durable goods such as automobiles, household 
appliances, and radios spread quickly in the middle classes 
until 1939 without taking on the character of mass con­
sumption. This stage was quickly left behind after World 
War II. The French then favored spending on health, trans­
portation, travel, and leisure out of a preference for a 
lifestyle centered on the home. During the 1970s and 
1980s, they welcomed without hesitation the (new) infor­
mation technologies. But lifestyles became more diverse 
according to criteria that were not solely based on differ­
ences in income.
The development of the French economy thus corre­
sponds to the general pattern of development of the West­
ern economies, notwithstanding a few notable distinctive 
features. The Revolution and Empire interrupted the take­
off of international trade for a long time. The accumulated 
lag made the integration of France into world trade diffi­
cult. Slow population growth explains the slowness with 
which social change occurred until the 1950s. Agrarian 
structures long slowed the spread of the agricultural revo­
lution. The slowness of urbanization limited the prospects 
offered by the domestic market. The economic policies 
adopted since the end of the nineteenth century were often 
poorly adapted. On the other hand, a business milieu in 
constant renewal was always able to find, after long peri­
ods of adaptation, new ways to innovate and to specialize
that were adapted to world demand. Consumers were re­
ceptive with regard to new products, and often even wel­
comed them with enthusiasm. Society, despite serious 
rigidities, was able to change. The profound trauma of 
World War II makes it possible to understand the speed of 
later changes and the ease with which they were accepted. 
At this time, French people experienced a humiliating feel­
ing of decadence and wished to affirm their modernity.
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Franqois Caron
The French Empire to 1789
To a significant degree, France’s early imperial develop­
ment paralleled that of Great Britain. Wide exploration but 
failed colonization in the sixteenth-centuiy yielded to 
more sustained conquest and population growth as the 
seventeenth century progressed. The eighteenth century
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was marked by pronounced economic and demographic 
growth centered in the Caribbean and North America. The 
French Empire also had unique characteristics. When at 
its largest physical size in 1683, it was underdeveloped. Its 
impressive economic advance thereafter was accompa­
nied by significant territorial reduction. Throughout the 
entire period, pervasive public disinterest, or even hostility 
to colonial ventures, reinforced low emigration rates. By 
1789, the reduced but flourishing empire was important to 
sectors of the metropolitan economy yet peripheral to 
most French people’s consciousness.
Repeatedly eclipsed by European affairs, French colo­
nization began fitfully. From the early sixteenth century, 
some French exploited opportunities in the New World. 
They supplied textiles and slaves to the Spanish and Por­
tuguese Empires, fished cod off Newfoundland, and 
bartered for fur on the North American continent—all 
activities that retained their importance. Yet the appeal 
of overseas ventures waned when neither bullion mines 
nor western routes to Asia were discovered, settlement 
schemes quickly miscarried, and the Wars of Religion 
(1562-1598) threw France into crisis. Only after 1600 wasa 
territorially based French Empire gradually established. 
Private commercial initiatives loomed largest, but the de­
sire of the Crown to strengthen the metropolitan economy 
and to improve France’s strategic position, as well as 
Counter Reformation missionary impulses, also encour­
aged colonization. At the empire’s apogee, France claimed 
some form of hegemony over vast areas around the globe. 
Predominantly settler colonies were established in the New 
World. They embraced a large swath of the North American 
mainland and nearby islands, stretching from Newfound­
land to the Gulf of Mexico. In these colonies, sparse immi­
grant populations fished, gathered fur, and raised crops on 
mainly family farms, often in uneasy coexistence with 
more numerous Native Americans. Settler colonies were 
also found on a dozen Caribbean islands (e.g., the French 
Antilles) and Cayenne in South America, where plantations 
grew tropical crops for export to Europe; Louisiana also 
had numerous plantations. Entrepots (comptoirs) in West 
Africa supplied slaves for Caribbean-area plantations. Sim­
ilar trading posts in India mainly furnished cloth, much of 
it likewise destined for the slave trade.
The eighteenth-centuiy empire coupled substantial 
growth—colonial populations more than quadrupled and 
French trade with its empire grew more rapidly than did 
that of its chief rival. Great Britain—with the loss of con­
siderable territory. With the signing of the Treaty of 
Utrecht (1713), France surrendered claims to Hudson’s 
Bay, Acadia, and Newfoundland to Great Britain; at the 
end of the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), France gave up 
all its remaining continental North American possessions, 
the smaller West Indian islands, and the African entrepots
(restored in 1783). In India, dreams of French domination 
likewise ended in 1763, leaving France with a few trading 
posts on the subcontinent and, in the Indian Ocean, lie 
Bourbon (Reunion), lie de France (Mauritius), and the 
Seychelles, which were way stations that also raised tropi­
cal crops for export. In 1789, France retained possessions 
scattered across the seas, but the rich and dynamic West 
Indian sugar islands of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and 
Saint Domingue (western Hispaniola) now formed the 
core of its empire.
Tools of Empire. Mercantilist acts that were intended 
to foster both economic development and state power reg­
ulated much of the French imperial economy—again 
much like the British. Policies known collectively as the 
Exclusif mandated that all colonial products be sent di­
rectly to France on French ships and that colonists use on­
ly French goods (also carried solely on French ships), 
while sharply restricting colonial manufacturing. Fre­
quently, however, these restrictions had to be violated, 
largely because the supply of necessary goods was recur­
rently interrupted. Chartered companies, granted trading 
monopolies for designated geographical areas, were re­
peatedly established and just as repeatedly failed. Under­
capitalized, burdened with high costs and excessive cen­
tral control and regulation, and outflanked by domestic 
and foreign interlopers, most companies did little to devel­
op either colonial economies or imperial trade.
Many merchants (supported by some Crown officials) 
preferred to trade on their own, both within protected 
colonial markets and as interlopers. These forms of “free 
trade” were always important in the New World because of 
the proximity of vast Spanish-American markets and en­
terprising Dutch and British merchants on neighboring is­
lands. After 1763, authorities sought to calm unrest among 
Antillean planters and merchants by opening some 
Caribbean ports to foreign ships, regularizing what had 
long been common practice. At that time, too. East Indian 
trade was liberalized. Still, the establishment of new char­
tered companies for Cayenne (1777) and Senegal (1785) 
and the revival of the recently abolished East India Com­
pany demonstrated the continuing hold of mercantilist ap­
proaches among powerful policymakers.
Economic Balance Sheet: France. Its first empire 
produced mixed results for France’s economy. Together 
with Indian cottons, such “groceries" as sugar, coffee, and 
tobacco stimulated important processing industries and 
innovative consumption habits. According to some schol­
ars, these changes promoted a “consumer revolution” in 
the 1730s and 1740s. Existing manufactures like textiles 
benefited from a growing—if predominantly enslaved— 
colonial customer base. And though its effects are hard 
to distinguish from those of nonimperial commerce and 
of fishing, colonial trade provided additional stimulus
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French Empire. Slave labor on a Caribbean sugar plantation, seventeenth century. From Jean-Baptiste Duterfes Histoire des Antilles, 
Paris, 1667, vol. 2, p. 122. (New York Public Library/Art Resource, NY)
to shipbuilding and allied manufacturing, provisioning 
trades, maritime insurance and related services, and the 
building of port infrastructure. But just as for Great 
Britain, the rise of plantation slave colonies in the eigh­
teenth century had the weightiest influence. Colonial trade 
grew at least twentyfold between 1716 and 1720 and 1784 
and 1788, whereas French foreign trade as a whole tripled; 
by 1789, colonial trade formed a larger proportion of all 
foreign trade in France than in Great Britain.
Recent research suggests that many areas and industries 
initieilly participated in the imperial economy. But from the 
1730s, a dynamic, export-oriented, largely Atlantic France 
pulled ahead of the stagnant, heavily agricultural interior. 
The empire heightened French regional disparities, even 
within the dynamic zone. A handful of ports controlled 
colonial trade; Bordeaux alone accounted for half. Yet their 
effects were not widely felt. In sharp contrast to Great 
Britain, the internal market for consumer goods grew slow­
ly in France. So most port areas developed as enclaves fo­
cused on specific, usually external, markets, such as north­
ern Europe, the destination of most processed groceries.
Merchants, too, benefited unequally from colonial 
trade. Slow debt collection and falling prices after trade 
liberalization in the 1760s increasingly squeezed profits; 
and by the 1780s, liquidity crises or even bankruptcy 
threatened many merchants, despite continuing rapid 
quantitative growth. Though commercial expansion had 
attracted numerous small firms, the biggest companies, 
which also often owned shipyards and colonial planta­
tions, increasingly dominated.
Whether because of strong tenurial rights and masked 
attachment to the land, a generally immobile and back­
ward economy, roadblocks put in the path of religious dis­
sidents, or other factors, French emigration was by far Eu­
rope’s lowest. In French North America, moreover, less 
than a third of migrants remained, a much higher rate of 
return than other European colonies witnessed. Thus the 
small size of nonslave colonial population and the poverty 
of the enslaved provided only limited stimulus to French 
manufacturing. Whereas in Great Britain colonies and 
metropole developed as complementary markets, French 
industrial growth depended on exports to Europe. By the
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late 1780s, half of French imports came from overseas and 
half from Europe, but three-fourths of exports went to Eu­
rope, with just a quarter going overseas. Ironically, Span­
ish America, reached either via Spain or directly (often as 
contraband), formed one of the leading colonial markets 
for French industrial products, particularly linen and 
woolen textiles.
Economic Balance Sheet: Colonies. Beginning in the 
late seventeenth century and accelerating once sugar be­
came king in the 1730s, the Antilles experienced strong 
growth. Saint Domingue s sugar output grew eightfold in 
the eighteenth century; by 1780, all French islands’ output 
exceeded that of their British competitors. On the eve of 
the French Revolution (1789-1799), Saint Domingue 
alone—source of two-fifths of world sugar production and 
half the world’s coffee, and home to two-thirds of all the 
slaves in the entire French Empire—accounted for 40 per­
cent of French foreign trade. Population in the French An­
tilles, half that of the British West Indies in 1700, was larg­
er by 1790, and consumed a large proportion of all French 
exports, despite an extremely skewed wealth distribution 
that severely dampened demand among the nearly seven 
hundred thousand slaves. On balance, the Antilles most 
closely approximated the mercantilist ideal; producing on­
ly primary products, importing all manufactures, and rais­
ing only crops not grown in Europe, they had positive ef­
fects on the balance of payments and were relatively cheap 
to defend.
French North America also underwent pronounced 
growth in the eighteenth century. Population quadrupled, 
and from the 1730s exports diversified as an increasingly 
vigorous trade in grain and peas to the Antilles joined tra­
ditional furs, fish, and wood. Still, by 1760, on the eve of 
the British takeover, the seventy thousand or so French 
colonists represented less than 3 percent of the population 
of British North America, and they were dispersed over a 
vast territory suffering from weak economic, political, and 
military links. The economic base of French North Ameri­
ca was also much narrower than that of the thirteen 
British colonies. Virtually all manufactures were import­
ed; both official and private initiatives to develop cloth 
weaving, iron foundries, shipyards, and other industries 
using local raw materials came to grief. They fell victim to 
high costs, technological inadequacies, and settlers’ pref­
erence, given relative prices, for arable agriculture. Furs 
remained the largest export item, accounting for half the 
value of goods sent to Europe even in the mid-eighteenth 
century. Gathering and exchanging pelts played a central 
role in the economies of numerous Native American na­
tions living in areas over which France claimed what was 
usually a nominal sovereignty. These activities integrated 
natives into the Atlantic market economy yet also made at 
least some of them perilously dependent on the production
of one staple. Paradoxically, the fur trade became increas­
ingly marginal to the settler economy, providing only a few 
hundred jobs for French fur traders, the middlemen be­
tween Amerindians and metropolitan merchants, proces- 
sers, and consumers.
Though few and small, France’s Asian and African entre­
pots were integral to the imperial economy. French traders 
sought to obtain a variety of goods from throughout Asia; 
nevertheless, Indian cottons were always their main item. 
Exigent West African consumers demanded large quanti­
ties of blue cottons. White cottons were taken to France to 
be finished for reexport. To protect domestic fabrics, their 
sale was forbidden in the metropole, though fraud made 
them widely available even before restrictions were eased 
after the mid-eighteenth century. Since Asian consumers 
showed little interest in French or other European goods, 
gold and silver typically made up half or more of all car­
goes sent there.
The African slave trade was as vital to the development 
of the French Antilles plantation economies as to the rest 
of the European Caribbean. Trade with Africa had, howev­
er, only limited effects on France. Its impact was Icirgely 
confined to French merchants engaged in Asian trade, the 
source of the textiles that made up at least half of the car­
goes used to buy slaves, and to the area around Nantes, far 
and away the premier slaving port and home to most man­
ufacturers of “Negro cloths," cottons that imitated (poorly, 
in the eyes of many disdainful African consumers) Asian 
fabrics. As for the consequences for Africa of trade with 
France (and the rest of Europe), interpretations have 
changed. Historians once believed that this trade promot­
ed major changes. Scholars now acknowledge that the pro­
duction of goods and slaves remained in African hands: 
Because cloth and metals had long been known in Africa, 
imports, apart from firearms, neither created much new 
demand nor displaced existing commodities.
An Empire Suited to France. By 1789, then, the 
French Empire was considerably smaller than it had been 
a century earlier, having failed to compensate for the land 
ceded in North America with significant territorial gains 
elsewhere. Yet it retained an increasingly rich Caribbean 
nucleus as well as the African and Indian entrepots needed 
to service that core’s exigent labor demands. The dramatic 
growth in Franco-Antilles trade during the eighteenth cen­
tury suggests that the French policy that had evolved in the 
face of British military prowess—namely, to hold on to 
tropical colonies that supplied groceries for processing 
and reexport to Europe rather than to cling to any and all 
territory—was well advised, given French capabilities.
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Robert S. DuPlessis
The French Empire between 1789 and 1950
In 1789, France was on the verge of losing its entire "First 
Empire.” The starting point was the revolt in Santo 
Domingo (Saint-Domingue), which has been erroneously 
represented as originating in French-English rivalry ex­
acerbated by the French Revolution. The crisis was trig­
gered by a slave rebellion led by Toussaint Louverture. Al­
though as there were only 15,000 slaves in 1715, by 1789 
there were 450,000—in other words, less than one white 
for twenty blacks. The colonists’ only defense had be­
come terror and racism, enslavement based on skin color. 
The proslavery members of the Constituent Assembly 
succeeded in maintaining the institution despite Robe­
spierre’s strong opposition (“As soon as you utter the 
word ‘slaves’ in one of your decrees, you will have pro­
nounced your own dishonor and the undoing of your con­
stitution” [Archives parlementaires, vol. 84, 13 May 1791, 
p. 60]). Under the impact of the rebellion, the Legislative 
Assembly extended voting rights to all “free persons of 
color”; the convention briefly abolished slavery two years 
later (1793), but Napoleon Bonaparte reestablished it in 
1802.
The British blockade had cut off relations between 
France and its empire, temporarily ruining the sugar cane 
industry to the benefit of sugar beet growers. The Treaty of 
Vienna in 1815 left France only scattered remnants: Mar­
tinique and Guadeloupe in the Caribbean and the ports of 
llede Goree and Saint-Louis in Senegcil. The English had 
abolished the slave trade during their occupation; its re­
sumption was demanded in the name of free trade by the 
Creoles of Saint-Louis in the “register of grievances” sub­
mitted to the Assembly of the Estates General in 1789.
Preoccupied with its Industrial Revolution at home, 
France did not turn again toward empire until the second 
half of the century. The conquest of Algeria in 1830 was 
destined to turn the attention of the French public away 
from the domestic political problems of the ultraconserva­
tive government of King Charles X. Economic interests 
had a good deal to do with the conflict in Algeria, whose 
origins went back to the directory: a financial conflict had 
allowed the dey to demand reimbursement for a grain de­
livery along with interest on the unpaid amount. The expe­
dition proceeded quickly: France landed five hundred 
ships with thirty-five thousand men from its expeditionary 
corps on 14 June 1830, and the dey capitulated on 5 July. 
The July Monarchy, which came to power at the end of Ju­
ly was undecided on what course to follow with the risky 
and potentially costly Algerian venture. At first, the monar­
chy considered an attempt to control the country without 
annexing it directly, via recognition by the Turkish author­
ities. But it nearly immediately proved impossible. Minis­
ters temporalized, and the ad hoc and self-serving meas­
ures of local military commanders decided French policy. 
Characteristic of these actions was the looting of the treas­
ury, confiscation of the property of expelled authorities, 
and sequestration of many habous (religious endowment 
property) that provided mosques and schools with inde­
pendent revenues. The Parliamentary Commission on 
Africa acknowledged a devastating balance sheet for the 
operations in 1833 but nevertheless opted for coloniza­
tion. A revolt organized by Abdelkader began in 1832, and 
lasted more than fifteen years.
The influence of Marseille merchants was equally deci­
sive in West Africa. In 1843, on the Dahomey coast, the 
Marseille-based house of Regis gained control of palm oil, 
valued as the raw material for the burgeoning soap indus­
try and as an industrial lubricant. Libreville was created 
on the Gabonese coast the same year. The political turning 
point came in 1851 with the report from the Commission 
on Trade and Commerce for the African Coasts (Schnap- 
per, 1961). The so-called fulcrum policy was developed by 
Prime Minister Guizot in Parliament. In 1840, Bugeaud 
was named governor general of Algeria, and he raised 
the number of French troops to more than one hundred 
thousand in 1847—one soldier for every thirty inhabitants.
